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1 
Transcription of 2014 Chapman Law Review 
Symposium “Business Tax Reform: Emerging 
Issues in the Taxation of U.S. Entities” 
Keynote Address: “Corporate Tax Reform, 
Business Tax Reform, or Capital Income Tax 
Reform?” 
Edward D. Kleinbard 
The following is a lightly-edited transcription of Professor 
Edward D. Kleinbard’s oral remarks at the 2014 Chapman Law 
Review Symposium.*  
INTRODUCTION OF PROFESSOR EDWARD D. KLEINBARD BY 
MICHAEL LANG, PROFESSOR OF LAW, CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY DALE 
E. FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW  
It is my distinct pleasure to introduce to you Edward D. 
Kleinbard from USC Law School. Ed has an interesting 
background. He got his BA in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 
and he also has an MA in History, both from Brown University. 
Those of you who think there is a good preparation for tax in 
taking something like Economics, no. Tax is obscure and arcane. 
Medieval and Renaissance studies is where you get the 
background. He has his JD from Yale Law School, and he was a 
partner with Cleary Gottlieb in New York for two decades. When 
he left Cleary Gottlieb, he became Chief of Staff for the U.S. 
Congress Joint Committee on Taxation, and he has been at the 
University of Southern California Gould School of Law and a 
fellow at the Century Foundation since 2009. He is a prolific 
scholar of a wide range of tax policy issues, including: stateless 
income, tax expenditures in a tax base, proposals from 
presidential candidates and Capitol Hill, and a dual income tax 
with different rates for capital income and labor income. Join me 
in extending a warm welcome to Ed Kleinbard.  
                                                          
 * His keynote address was accompanied by a presentation available at  
http://www.chapman.edu/law/publications/chapman-law-review/annual-symposium/2014-
symposium/.  
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS OF EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, PROFESSOR OF 
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GOULD SCHOOL OF 
LAW 
Michael, thank you very much and thank you all for being 
here. Since this is a business tax symposium, it seemed to me 
worthwhile, before we figure out how to do business tax reform, 
to think about what it is we want to reform and why. In 
particular, I wish to ask the question, “Are we reforming the 
corporate income tax, the business income tax, or capital income 
taxation?” Calls for business tax reform are all around us, but we 
have to remember that in the United States, businesses and 
corporations are not synonymous. Meanwhile, there is a deeper 
level to the question of what it is we might want to think about, 
and that is the idea of capital income.   
There are only two meaningful kinds of income: labor income 
and capital income. Those of you who have taken Tax I might 
have the impression that tax practice is all about discovering a 
stash of cash in a second hand piano. Cases involving this, 
record-setting home run baseballs, or treasure trove turn out to 
be a very small part of the typical practice. For our purposes of 
approximation, income is either from labor, or as a return on 
capital.  
Capital income means all returns to savings and investment, 
not just capital gains. For example, capital income would include 
interest income, rents, or dividends. It would also include net 
business profits, because the labor inputs to business, in an ideal 
world, have already been accounted for through the deduction for 
wages. In a public corporation in particular, where if you want to 
get the returns to your labor paid out to you, you take them in 
the form of wages, what is left is some kind of return to capital. 
Why is it that we want reform? One obvious answer is that 
the corporate headline rate, the 35% statutory rate, is 
uncompetitive. That is true in the sense that the U.S. headline 
rate is now substantially higher than the statutory rate in many 
other jurisdictions. Alternatively, do we want to engage in 
business tax reform to capture incremental economic efficiency 
gains? Again, it is certainly true that economically similar kinds 
of returns to capital are taxed at wildly different rates. That, in 
turn, leads to misallocation of investments. The most conspicuous 
example, of course, is homes, where by virtue of the heavy 
subsidization of home ownership, U.S. households have 
disproportionately invested in housing rather than in productive 
business capital.  
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Or do we want to pursue reform to advance distributional 
goals? One of the differences between rich people and other 
people is that rich people have more money. They have more 
capital, and as a result, they have more capital income. How you 
tax capital income therefore has a huge distributional 
implication. It is much more heavily top-weighted than our 
distributions of labor income.  
Finally, what about revenue? Are we trying to reform 
business taxation in order to collect more revenue because we are 
short of our revenue needs?  
Let’s try and disentangle all these. Here I am going to keep 
peeling back layers of the onion. Is the corporate rate really 
uncompetitive? Yes, of course the statutory rate is, but we know 
for a fact that the effective real-life tax rate—the real-life 
burden—on foreign income of U.S. multinationals is in the single 
digits. Domestic effective tax rates are very different. Corporate 
effective tax rates in the United States, which you would think 
would be our first priority, get amazingly little attention in public 
discourse. If you look at the effective tax rate on a firm’s next 
investment, its marginal investment—unincorporated businesses 
are a little bit lower-taxed than corporates; maybe 25% for 
corporations and 21 or 22% for unincorporated entities.  
If we truly want a more economically efficient environment, 
the resulting tax system will require radical overhaul, as we will 
see in a minute. That is going to require thinking much more 
comprehensively about the different instances of capital income 
and how we can link them in some useful way.  
Remember also that if economic efficiency is your goal, there 
is a classic problem: the usual base-broadening and rate-lowering 
intuition is said to reward old capital. That is, old investments 
would simultaneously enjoy the benefits of  old accelerated 
depreciation methods and new lower rates. Why should we 
reward old investment through classic base broadening and rate 
lowering? I personally think that this issue is somewhat 
overstated, since old capital and new capital tend to go hand-and-
glove. Firms that have old capital tend to continue and make new 
investments. But nonetheless, the efficiency is not easy to 
capture. Distributional goals are generally thought to conflict 
with efficiency goals because, from a distributional point of view, 
you might want to have a significant tax on capital incomes since 
they are so top-weighted. From an efficiency point of view, we 
want to encourage investment because ultimately that leads to 
greater productivity, greater GDP in the United States.  
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Revenue goals are the most fraught of all as a political 
matter. The reason tax reform in a broad sense cannot happen is 
that there is no agreement—or in my view, possibility—of 
agreement on the fundamental question of how large government 
should be and therefore how much we should finance. Those of us 
who think about tax tend to ask the questions in the wrong order. 
We start by asking, “How should we reform taxation?” But the 
government of the United States is not in business for the 
purpose of collecting taxes. The government of the United States, 
like all governments, is in business to spend money. The first 
question, the ultimate question, and the question dealt with at 
length in my new book We Are Better Than This: How 
Government Should Spend Our Money, is: What should we be 
spending our money on, and only then, how should we finance 
that spending? Frankly, tax policy is much, much easier than 
spending policy, but we have muddled the two, and so we 
indirectly argue about how much we should be spending under 
the guise of arguing about how much tax revenue we should be 
collecting. This is a backwards way of phrasing the question. 
Instead, we need to ask, “What should we be spending on, and 
then, can we afford to finance that?” It is really a fundamentally 
different perspective. That is one of the reasons why public 
debates on tax reform are so unproductive, because we are really 
arguing about government spending, and we are doing so 
through the guise of arguing about the tax system.  
Let’s peel off another layer: Do  we wish to reform corporate 
income, or business income? The United States is really unique 
among large economies in having half of its domestic business 
income in the unincorporated sector. You cannot treat 
partnerships, LLCs, and the like as some kind of a rounding 
error. Now, that number is somewhat overstated, as there are 
incentives to muddle labor and capital income for firms with the 
classic owner-entrepreneur; in other words, the closely held firm 
with an owner-entrepreneur. The result is that there is, in fact, a 
lot of implicit labor income in the United States that is being 
presented as net business profits of closely held firms. If you look 
at capital intensiveness, the number is probably closer to 70/30. 
That is, corporations probably have 70% of the capital 
investment, and that is just a rough-and-ready rule of thumb.  
But remember that when you start down the path, 
whichever path you take, there are weird overlap issues. If you 
want to do corporate tax reform and pay for it through closing 
business tax expenditures, like accelerated depreciation, you are 
asking the unincorporated sector to pay for lower corporate rates. 
And conversely if, like Dave Camp, you propose a large-scale 
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reform where individual rates are lowered, businesses are asked 
to pay more, as we will see. In fact, the tax burdens on 
unincorporated entities in a proposal like Dave Camp’s involve 
two things moving in opposite directions: after reform, they 
would face higher business taxable income tax, and they have 
lower rates on that business income. Thus, when thinking about 
the Camp proposal, we in fact have to think not just about how 
much business will be paying through base broadening, but also 
how much unincorporated entites are receiving through lower 
rates.  
If we really want to have serious reform, we have to think 
much more radically, and we would want a system in which 
capital income is taxed at consistent rates, regardless of the form 
of financial investment. First, why do we care so much whether 
something is called debt or equity? Why should the effective tax 
rate vary so much? Second, it turns out that depreciation is not 
just for accountants. It turns out that depreciation is in fact the 
way that you measure returns to real financial investment. 
(When eonomists say “real,” they mean investment in greasy 
machinery and the like, as opposed to financial investments.) 
Depreciation and amortization of intangibles are essential to 
whether you are accurately measuring capital income from real 
investments. Third, you would have rules that would get the 
same results without regard to the form of business organization.  
I recognize that it is fun to have clients come in to your law 
office, and to recommend an S Corporation for one client, and an 
LLC for another. But if reform is your goal you want to take a big 
step back and think about a system that treats capital income 
consistently; you would not have different rules for different 
forms of business organization. If you really want to pick up 
these efficiency gains from taxing capital income more 
coherently, you need to tax all business enterprises identically. 
You need to rethink “debt versus equity” kinds of distinctions. 
And you would need to tease apart labor and capital income in a 
closely held firm through what I call a “labor-capital income 
centrifuge” so that you are applying the right rules to the right 
kind of income.  
Very quickly, we can say with certainty that we are doing an 
okay job with labor income, we really are. If labor income were 
all that we cared about, and we are not that far off the mark. 
However, we do a horrific job at taxing capital income. 
CBO did a great study a few years ago which found that the 
effective tax rates, the marginal investment by a corporation, 
could swing from 36% to −6%, depending on how it is financed, 
the depreciation rules, and so on. That is a 42 percentage point 
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 8:23 PM 
6 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
swing in effective tax rate. When you look at investments that 
are debt-financed and have accelerated depreciation, and 
someone says, “That has a negative effective marginal tax rate,” 
what they are saying is that all of us are paying money to that 
company to make that investment, which is a very odd thing to 
ask of us in a world that is supposed to be market-driven.  
If you want to think these sorts of radical thoughts about 
capital income, what rate should we apply? There are all kinds of 
capital income: there is the dull, plodding returns, from return to 
waiting; there is the so-called normal returns; there is the 
returns from taking on risk; and there are economic rents, which 
are the super-sized returns, because you have a special angle, 
you have a patent, and you have a unique position that you can 
exploit. There is no reason to believe that those three kinds of 
income should be taxed the same, and there is certainly no 
reason to think that, as a logical matter, they ought to be taxed 
the same as labor income. It would be true only by coincidence.  
What I am suggesting is that capital income reform is a 
great aspirational goal. It turns out to be technically possible, but 
it requires very radical rethinking: treating all business 
enterprises alike, treating all kinds of financial investments 
alike, separating labor from capital income, and having a 
coherent theory about which kinds of capital income are taxed at 
which rate. Capital income reform is too large a topic to tackle 
today, however I have an idea for a solution called the “dual 
business enterprise income tax,” and it is the subject of my book 
We Are Better Than This.  
Let us return our focus to more traditional corporate reform 
and business reform. When you start thinking about business 
reform today, you cannot avoid the central importance of how 
international income is taxed. This is a corporate issue. 
Unincorporateds have very little international incomes. We can 
all agree that it is critically important both to the firms 
themselves—multinational firms themselves—and to any tax 
reform initiative.  
I think we can all agree as well that the current law is just 
immensely flawed. Corporations are quick to say that they face 
an uncompetitive business environment. Their idea of 
“competitiveness” requires what I call a “toothless territorial tax 
system.” These complaints are largely fact free. In fact, if you 
look at the effective tax rates on major U.S. multinationals today, 
they are under foreign income. Whether you look at a Microsoft, 
an Apple, a Google, or a General Electric, their effective tax rates 
on their foreign income is in the single digits. There is no country 
in the world in which they actually do business that has tax rates 
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as low as their worldwide effective rate on their non-U.S. income. 
General Electric just reported $13 billion of income for the last 
year, on which they had a worldwide effective tax rate—
including the United States—of 4.2%. 
Very quickly, the U.S. international tax system today really 
becomes an ersatz kind of territorial system. If you look at cash 
taxes that are actually paid, yes, some money comes back. The 
money that comes back, comes back with full foreign tax credit. I 
talked about this at length in the article Stateless Income. So the 
actual taxes paid on repatriated earnings today is close to nil. We 
do have the cost of the so-called “lock-out phenomenon” in which 
income must be held nominally in the ownership of the foreign 
subsidiary. 
Competitiveness is therefore not the issue. Current law, 
however, does have extraordinary behavioral distortions. For 
example, the famous “lock-out effect” allows firms to have 
trillions of dollars of earnings that are owned by their foreign 
affiliates in order to take advantage of gaming current law. And 
because of arbitrage opportunities, in particular the opportunity 
to leave all of your interest expense in the United States and let 
your foreign income accumulate at very low rates, the U.S. 
domestic corporate tax base is at risk. It is at risk to an extent 
that is not fully appreciated.  
My stateless income papers in effect try to develop the 
following: it always understood that U.S. tax system had 
incentives for firms to distort their results, i.e., to book as foreign 
income—income that arguably was really earned in the United 
States, and possibly to make foreign investments in low tax 
countries. However, it turns out that if you look a layer deeper at 
how international taxation actually works, we are incentivizing 
U.S. firms to invest in high-tax foreign countries because it is 
then extremely easy for them to move the income from a starting 
point in Germany, via Freedonia, to Bermuda, where it finally 
comes to rest. The result is a perverse incentive to invest outside 
the United States, not necessarily just on some island that is 
barely above high tide, but to invest in real foreign countries and 
then to shift those profits to those tax-haven atolls. And that is 
exactly how U.S. firms actually operate.  
The consequences of and the explanation for the urgency 
that U.S. firms bring to the debate today about their 
competitiveness is not that they in fact face a high foreign 
effective tax rate; it is that they are hoist by their own petard. 
They have earned so much low tax income that they now have 
$2 trillion of earnings outside the United States in a nominal 
sense, owned by their foreign subsidiaries. They would sincerely 
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like to use that money to prop up the share price of their 
companies. That is their goal, but they cannot. That is the only 
thing they cannot do. The money instead is invested in U.S. 
Treasuries, it is in U.S. bank deposits, it is in the United States, 
but it is not propping up share price, and that is troublesome for 
companies. That is what is really going on today. There is no 
material tax or GAAP-drag from current law. The result is this 
very distortive environment in which U.S. firms have an 
incentive to invest outside the United States. There is an 
efficiency cost in all the resources, they have to be devoted. Lost 
opportunities for Americans are a social cost. And the “lock-out 
phenomenon” does lead to sub-optimal investment decisions. 
Finally, there is the base erosion point domestically.  
There are only three problems in doing better on the 
international side. First, what exactly is a U.S. company? What 
do we mean when we say, “This is a U.S. company subject to 
certain rules?” Second, figuring out the source of income—where 
is it really earned—is even more difficult, and I would argue in 
fact, rises to the level of impossibility. Third, the politics are 
made much more difficult by what I called “tax mercantilism,” 
which is when countries have gone out of the business of explicit 
export subsidies, but try to achieve analogous goals through the 
tax system. We no longer engage in explicit trade wars—that is 
one of the things GATT, the General Agreement of Trades and 
Tariffs, and the World Trade Organization has done for us. 
Instead, countries have switched their subsidy programs to the 
tax arena. The United Kingdom, for example, has gone into the 
business of trying to attract European multinationals to 
re-headquarter in London and provide them a lower tax rate on 
their non-UK income than would be true if they stayed in their 
home countries. When you have countries competing on that 
basis, the international environment becomes very difficult.   
Let us talk about where tax reform is today. The President 
has said that he wants a lower corporate tax rate, perhaps 28%. 
He has not quite explained how that is going to happen. He has 
said that he wants to tax existing offshore permanently 
reinvested earnings. The President wants to tax that to collect 
about $150 billion to invest in the United States infrastructure. 
And he wants to raise another $250 billion by making the 
international tax regimes tougher.  
Dave Camp, by contrast, has a really big comprehensive bill, 
and there are a lot of good aspects to the bill. It is designed to be 
revenue-neutral over the ten-year budget window, the official 
window of time that Congress looks at, and to do so by having, in 
the aggregate, lower tax revenues on personal income. He 
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proposes a corporate rate of 25%. The individual rate—the 
highest bracket—would go down to 35%, but on a broader base 
than current law, so many high income individuals actually 
might pay more. On the international side he would move to a 
territorial system funded in part by a $170 billion transition tax 
on those same permanantely reinvested offshore earnings. If you 
were to look closely at the Joint Committee’s revenue estimates 
for what this bill would mean, it shows $590 billion more of 
business taxes in the next ten years, and $590 billion less in 
personal income taxes, but as I’ll explain in a minute, for 
unincorporated business owners, this accounting is misleading, 
as it is only the net of the two moves that is relevant. 
Can we get to a deal? The Camp bill, unlike the President’s 
observations, is comprehensive, it is detailed, and you can 
actually talk about it. There are a lot of points in common. 
Everyone agrees that the headline rate on corporate income has 
to come down. Everyone agrees that the international system is 
unstable and that the lock-out effect—the idea that foreign 
subsidiaries must retain their low tax foreign earnings to get 
lower effective tax rates and have a tax penalty if they repatriate 
too much to United States—is unwise.  
There seems to be some confusion about the idea that 
business tax reform should be revenue-neutral because Camp 
imposes more tax on the business sector. I would have thought 
there would have been consensus. But we will dissect that in a 
minute. It remains the case that there is no chance whatsoever of 
consensus on this larger issue of how much overall revenue 
should be collected, because that is really the stalking horse for 
how big government should be. That means that if we are going 
to see business tax reform anytime in the next several years, we 
must look at it as a separate piece of legislation.  
The current Camp Bill has to crash and burn and then, 
phoenix-like, a business-only legislation has to emerge. That is 
the only scenario that I can ever see working. That in turn has 
its own complexities. A number of people, including the 
President, are very unenthusiastic about breaking out business 
tax reform. There are a number of technical issues in doing so, 
and very different views about what to do about international 
income.  
The Camp bill is a piece of serious legislative drafting, fully 
scored by the JCT. We should talk about how it is that a 
Republican Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee would 
produce legislation that would impose $590 billion more tax on 
businesses, notwithstanding the lower rate. That seems very odd. 
The answer is in part that this overlooks the netting that goes on 
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within the unincorporated sector. That is, the Camp bill broadens 
the business income base, but individual rates are going down. 
The JCT staff scored the former as “more business taxes” and the 
latter as “lower individual taxes,” even though the two are netted 
against each other on the tax return of an unincorporated firm. If 
you make a few sensible assumptions, that really what is going 
on is $250 billion or so is being used from the corporate sector to 
finance the personal sector, once you net all the unincorporated 
business stuff.  
The JCT, a wonderful group, presents things to some extent 
in ways that they were told. Nonetheless, it is a fair criticism of 
the long and detailed revenue estimates that were prepared that 
you cannot answer the question how much the corporate sector’s 
tax burdens are rising compared to personal income tax returns. 
That is a normal question to ask; that is a question we ought to 
be able to answer. But because of the way they present all of 
business in one lump and then all of the consequences of personal 
rate reduction over on different tables, you cannot answer these 
very straightforward questions. I find that to be very frustrating. 
I would also hypothesize that there is a piece of paper with that 
answer. This is what Chairmen of Ways and Means Committees 
do, so that when an important constituent who has an 
unincorporated business comes into see you, you say, “Here, let 
me show you the picture,” and there is a piece of paper 
somewhere that says, “This is how much net corporates are 
bearing, this is how much net the personal side is bearing.”  
The numbers themselves—even once you get past this 
question of how much is really being shifted from business to 
personal side—are quite fuzzy, as often is the case. It turns out 
that doing what everyone wants, reducing the corporate tax rate 
to 25%, is very expensive: $680 billion over ten years. In fact the 
real number is greater, because Camp phases in the lower rate 
over five years. We don’t even have a full ten-year cost for a 25% 
tax rate. Then we have these other two personal income items 
that basically wash out against each other. If these were fully 
phased in, you would be looking at $800 billion more in revenue, 
lost through reducing personal tax rates. That is a big hole to fill. 
There also is a lot of frontloading and backloading that goes 
on in the bill. The phase-in of the lower rate for corporation is an 
example of backloading the cost of the legislation. Slower 
depreciation and amortization rules tend to effectively frontload 
the revenue pick up from those changes. The international 
provisions of the Camp bill would raise about $70 billion over ten 
years, but that turns out to be entirely fictitious. It is because of 
a one-time $170 billion tax on the existing stock pile of of 
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permanently reinvested earnings. If you take that out, the Camp 
bill would reduce burdens on international income by another 
$100 billion. You take income that today is taxed at a single-digit 
effective rate and say, “You know what, let’s all throw another 
hundred billion dollars your way.” It is not the call I would have 
made.  
Finally, some of the revenue pick ups are unrealistic even to 
me, like rules requiring you to capitalize and amortize 
advertising expenses and rules that would require you to 
capitalize and amortize research and development rather than 
expense it, as we do currently. These are very, very large 
numbers, which is why I mentioned them, and not very likely 
ones.  
What to do, what to do? Well of course, what you want to do 
right now is stand up and shout, “But surely dynamic analysis 
will fill the gap.” This requires a visit from the growth fairy, and 
it also turns out that this dynamic estimating stuff is very 
difficult. When the JCT does a revenue estimate, the revenue 
estimate is dynamic in the sense that it does take behavior into 
account. It does not however, assume that GNP (Gross National 
Product) will be affected—it has a fixed GNP constraint. 
So-called “dynamic analysis” or macroeconomic analysis says, 
“What will this tax legislation do for the economy as a whole?”  
The JCT macro analysis of the Camp bill suggests under 
some circumstances that there could be some growth in GDP over 
the next ten years. But every point needs to be asterisked. Macro 
analyses do not predict compounded growth in perpetuity. In 
fact, if you think about it, revenue-neutral legislation should not 
have huge macro effects because what one person is getting, 
another person is losing. Thus, the extent of growth effects would 
be limited to some modest efficiency gains.  
We therefore should be very suspicious of a revenue-neutral 
legislation that is said to have huge macroeconomic 
consequences. Most interestingly, the real lesson to take from the 
JCT macro study of the Camp bill is that the effective tax rate on 
capital income appears to be going up, because they are 
predicting lower capital investment in the future or break-even 
capital investment in the future. All of the GDP pick up from the 
Camp bill comes from more consumption. It comes from the fact 
that individuals whose income is primarily labor income have 
lower taxes. Therefore, they will spend more, and that leads to a 
larger economy. But it does not do so forever. You do not in fact 
grow simply by spending more; you have to invest more to grow 
more. The real irony of the Camp bill is that it is at best 
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lukewarm, and arguably hostile, to investment through all of the 
changes it proposes.  
Finally, it is worth taking a minute to talk about the JCT 
conclusion because it is so important. The JCT’s macro 
conclusions have been widely misunderstood in the press. In fact, 
Dave Camp did misspeak a couple of times in public media that 
were to the advantage of the point he wanted to make. So I think 
I should, on his behalf, correct the record. The JCT macro study 
of the Camp tax bill found, in the best possible case they could 
conceive of, that GDP would grow by 1.6% in the aggregate over 
the next ten years. That is not the same as saying that the 
growth rate of the economy would increase by 1.6 percentage 
points a year for the next ten years. The economy is predicted to 
grow about 2.5% a year for the next ten years; this misreading 
would mean that the economy will grow at 4.1% a year instead. 
That would be nice but it is not what he said. What JCT said 
was, “Instead of having $233 trillion of aggregate GDP over the 
next ten years, we will have $237 trillion—maybe—in the best 
possible case that we could conceive of.” That is not the same 
thing. If you do the arithmetic, it implies that instead of a 2.5% 
growth rate, we would have maybe a 2.8% growth rate in the best 
possible scenario.   
Even a small increase in GDP growth would be nice if it were 
true, but it is not sustainable in perpetuity if in fact investment 
is not keeping pace, which I think is consistent with the JCT 
staff’s conclusions. And it requires some heroic assumptions in 
the model about human nature, among other things, because it 
assumes that individuals basically, in effect, live forever and 
have perfect foresight as to the future. That is effectively what 
the model assumes about human beings. It makes the modeling 
easier; it just makes the results inherently spurious. The results 
have nothing to do with life as it is lived in the world that we 
actually know.  
Even on its own terms, the Camp bill is revenue challenged. 
It is not a sustainable revenue-neutral legislation. I think 
actually a point of order might lie against it in the Senate for 
that reason. Even without regard to the Byrd Rule, there is a 
newer point of order that I think would lie against it for this 
reason. What are we going to do about that? What is the case for 
$100 billion of lower tax on international income? What is the 
case for shifting $250 or more billion net to the personal side and 
having a significant tax hike on corporations at least for the next 
ten years? It is not at all clear what the business case is for those 
fundamental directions that the Camp bill is going in, 
notwithstanding all of the good ideas that are in it.  
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Finally, let us remember what we are really talking about. If 
you really want to fill the revenue hole, this entire conversation 
is nonsensical, because the Fiscal Cliff tax deal of January 2013 
destroyed our budget. In 2012, the official CBO baseline basically 
showed us growing out of deficit problems. It showed us raising 
about 21% of GDP in tax revenues, and it showed deficits going 
down to 1% or so of GDP, which means we would actually be 
paying down our national debt, because if the economy is growing 
significantly faster than that, the result is that national debt as a 
percentage of GDP would be declining. We were in a very good 
place from a budget point of view in January 2012.  
In January 2013, we reversed course and made permanent 
all of the Bush tax cuts except for those individuals earning over 
$450,000 which is the reverse of the assumption that CBO made 
in 2012, because it followed the law which contemplated that all 
of those would expire. Thus, the result is that $4.6 trillion of new 
deficits appeared, plus additional interest. Those numbers now 
show a total deficit prediction of $8 trillion over the next ten 
years. Eight trillion dollars? That is half of 2014 GDP. That 
should focus the attention of young people in the room, who will 
not doubt be affected by this, and who should think seriously 
about these issues.  
Slashing spending is in fact an exercise in magical thinking. 
Even if you want to seriously limit entitlement spending, the fact 
is that doing so must be phased in slowly. The last time we 
adjusted Social Security, for example, we did it over a thirty-year 
horizon. In the meantime, the deficits have to be financed. You 
cannot run the economy of the United States on revenues of 
18.5% of GDP. The United States in 2012, and it is predicted 
again in 2014, is in fact the lowest taxed country in the OECD as 
a percentage of GDP. We are not a high-taxed country. You are 
not unfairly put upon. This is a low-taxed paradise. The bankers 
of Zurich wish only that they could only endure the tax rates that 
we think are so punitive.  
So in sum, the Camp bill is too soft on international, clearly, 
too hard on capital investment, too soft on labor income, and 
where is the money going to come from to fund the trillion dollar 
deficit?  
Let us close by coming back to the international side, since 
that is where the big bid-ask spread difference is on corporate 
reform. Territorial solutions would say that international income 
should be taxed only where the income is earned abroad once. 
This works if you can have perfect confidence that the income 
around the world is, from a tax point of view, being attributed to 
the jurisdiction with the closest economic nexus to that income. If 
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 8:23 PM 
14 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
we could do that, a territorial system makes perfect sense. The 
trouble is, it is impossible. It is completely impossible to pin down 
income to say that this is the jurisdiction with the strongest 
nexus case.  
Why do we have multinationals? We have multinational 
enterprises because there are global synergies and lower internal 
transactions costs to doing business in this form, because they 
can conduct their business seamlessly across borders. All of that, 
in effect, should signal that it will be impossible to imagine a 
world in which we can predict with confidence the economic 
nexus of income. And because we cannot get very close at all to 
determining the geographic nexus of income, a territorial system 
in effect starts to fall apart. Everything else is like trying to hold 
back the sea with a broom—for example the current so-called 
“BEPS project”—because it begins with unsustainable premises. 
There is one success story in this nexus world. Section 954(h) 
was designed by the Treasury to allow financial services firms to 
earn banking-type income—financial income—outside the United 
States, and it is ferocious. And it works. It is one of the great 
myths of some writing in this area that banking income is easy to 
move around. It is exactly the opposite. Actually, banks are the 
only ones who in fact have to prove nexus in every case. No one is 
volunteering for more 954(h).  
The other direction is some kind of minimum tax as a safety 
net on international taxation or Baucus Option Z, which I think 
is sort of the worldwide true tax consolidation that I propose, 
combined with a split rate, a somewhat lower rate on 
international income than on domestic income.  
I prefer a true residence-based worldwide tax consolidation 
regime. This in effect would address the issue of nexus by saying, 
“It is impossible,” and instead give a great deal of weight to 
residence of the company. In effect, my preferred approach would 
say, “If a company is a U.S. firm, that has meaning, and we’re 
going to tax it at a rate that is within the norm of developed 
country rates—which would mean mid-twenties—and we are 
going to treat that worldwide income as logically within the scope 
of the U.S. tax net.”  
Why? What would be the policy justification for that? I think 
it comes out to a two-step analysis. The first step is: Why do we 
have a corporate tax at all? I think that the best answer is that a 
corporate tax is simply a non-refundable withholding tax on the 
income of owners. It is too hard to measure the income at the 
owner level. So the corporate tax really is a tax on owners in 
which the firm is just a proxy for owners. If you then assume that 
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the vast bulk of U.S. firms are ultimately owned by U.S. persons, 
then the idea of taxing U.S. firms on their worldwide income is 
not perfect—but it is good enough.  
The standard Treasury data say 85 to 90% of U.S. firms are 
U.S. owned. A recent article suggested that that overstates 
things. The answer is yes, it is not perfect, but the number is not 
45% either; if the number is 80 instead of 85, the basic claim that 
a U.S. firm is a pretty good proxy for U.S. investors still holds up. 
Given the impossibility of a territorial system, given the 
impossibility of the nexus of income, you need some other form of 
solution, and whether you call it a minimum tax, or a split rate 
on a worldwide income, in all of those cases, you have to 
recognize that what you are doing is in fact affirmatively 
embracing a residence-based tax system. I have tried to offer you 
a theory as to why doing so has some coherence. With that, I will 
stop, and I am delighted to take any questions.  
QUESTION AND ANSWER  
Audience Member: You indicate that there is not a 
competitive problem in the current system for internationals. 
Yet, in order to achieve that low rate of tax, they have to jump 
through hoops in a way that is entirely from the moon in terms of 
the transactions that they do, and if the IRS had more resources 
in terms of economists and auditors, much of that would be shut 
down. My thesis would be that that is why we have a low tax rate 
effectively on international income.  
Kleinbard: I do not actually agree with that. We have a low 
rate on international income because the United States has aided 
and abetted it through the CFC look-through rules, through the 
check-the-box rules. We are a pariah among sensible countries in 
that respect. Yes, there are a lot of arm’s-length pricing questions 
where people simply misprice relationships within the 
multinational group, but an awful lot of the income shifting that 
goes on is straight down the middle of the transfer pricing 
fairway.  
The result is driven by the nonsensical idea of treating 
foreign subsidiaries as independent actors with their own capital 
structure. So even if we had perfect transfer pricing, we would 
still have low effective foreign tax rates. The problem is deeper 
and more structural than can be solved through litigation. 
Nonetheless, you are absolutely right that there is a lot of fertile 
ground for litigation. Frankly, the IRS should reach out to the 
private sector more and bring in more private help on these big 
ticket litigation items. 
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 8:23 PM 
16 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
Audience Member: Thanks, very simple question. I am 
very sympathetic to your presentation. On your last point 
though, my question is, how does a worldwide tax system with a 
lot of pressure on residence of the corporation solve the problem, 
whereas to the obvious respons is, “Okay, well, we will 
incorporate in Cayman or we will incorporate in Bermuda.” Are 
you going to have some kind of attribution regime? 
Kleinbard: Yes. A residence-based system requires more 
sophisticated residence rules than we have today. It requires, in 
effect, an either/or test. It is like Lloyd Doggett’s bill that he 
introduces every year in which basically either you are 
incorporated in the United States or mind and management is in 
the United States. So if Mark Zuckerberg thought, “Geez, I am 
going to make a billion dollars or more, I should start life as a 
Cayman Islands company,” the mind and management of 
Facebook would still be in the United States; it would still be a 
U.S. company. There would be an occasional case that slips 
through. But government has to move on, and the advantage of 
this is that it is much simpler; it does not have the transfer 
pricing consequences that we just discussed because in the end, 
the money could be taxed somewhere at 25%. And if all the 
executives of Mark Zuckerberg’s firm actually decamp for the 
Cayman Islands, then I will take the risk of losing an occasional 
company.  
Audience Member: Thanks, you mentioned the ten-year 
budget window that Congress looks at, and in particular, denying 
deductions for IRAs and all kinds of other pension changes that 
would shift cost out into the future. 
Kleinbard: I do not know if everyone really understands 
what the questioner is saying. He is saying that another really 
good example of the backloading gimmicks going on is changing 
the way the IRAs work in ways that ultimately cost the 
government more money on present value terms if the IRAs do 
well, but which have the apparent effect of raising money inside 
the ten-year budget window and paying it out in forms of lower 
tax revenues in a more distant future.   
Audience Member: The question is really, do you have any 
thoughts about how to fix the ten-year? If we looking at it the 
wrong way, how can that be fixed? I think you mentioned a 
Senate point of order. 
Kleinbard: That is a really good question. I think that the 
right answer is that legislation needs to be scored on a present 
value basis, as well as the ten-year window basis. If we did a 
present value calculation, making some straightforward 
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assumptions, legislation like your example of the IRA switching 
game would be seen as radically not revenue-neutral. You would 
do that as an additional check on the process. In the Senate, my 
recollection, I’m not a parliamentarian, but my recollection of the 
new point of order is that the JCT has to certify to the Senate 
whether the legislation is predicted to lose more than $100 
million, I think, in any decade in the second, third, or fourth 
decade, and this legislation clearly would. So I think that there 
might be a point of order issue in the Senate. No one has said 
otherwise because nobody thinks that this legislation will ever 
get that far, but I can send to anyone that is interested a 
reference to the Senate point of order I have in mind.  
Audience Member: Thanks so much. Just a hypothetical: 
General Motors has a subsidiary that makes a car in Germany, it 
competes with the Volkswagen model made by Volkswagen in 
Germany. Under your proposal of the tax going with the United 
States jurisdiction, assume for a moment, again, all of these are 
hypotheticals, that the U.S. tax rate is higher than the German 
tax rate, why is that not a competitive issue? 
Kleinbard: There are a lot of levels to that answer. What 
you implicitly point out is that one of the consequences of relying 
on a residence-type approach to international taxation is that you 
lose some control over your tax rate. You cannot be that out of 
line with Germany’s rate and France’s rate because if you are, 
then you have this issue. That is sort of answer 1. Answer 2 is 
that worldwide tax systems, as we currently understand them, 
allow you to blend. So if in Fredonia your rate is lower than the 
German rate, you would blend—effectively for U.S. purposes—
the two, which would get you down to the U.S. rate. Now, an 
economist would say, “That just means you are compelling 
someone to invest in Freedonia as well as in Germany.” But 
multinationals tend to be everywhere, so the blending kind of 
works naturally for the large multinationals. Third, even if a 
U.S. individual invested directly in Volkswagen, we would expect 
her to pay tax on her worldwide income to bear whatever the 
U.S. tax cost is on top, so that if you think of a U.S. firm, again, 
recognizing it is not perfect; it is a rough-and-ready proxy for 
U.S. ultimate individual owners. The extra tax is in effect as one 
that should be imposed in that case.  
Audience Member: On the third point, the taxation on the 
corporate entity, it is undoubtedly higher if you follow your rule 
for the American entity. Your first point of course, is because we 
have chosen that, and obviously that is a policy call. It is kind of 
a libertarian answer which happens to warm my heart because 
you are saying, you choose America under this rule, this is the 
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consequence of your having a higher corporate high tax rate than 
your competitor. I did not hear you say that my point was wrong 
as much as that it is a consequence of what policy a government 
might choose. 
Kleinbard: I think that that is fair. Remember, however, 
my second point about blending. My basic response remains what 
I meant about losing control of our tax rate. When you go down 
this road, there has to be a concomitant commitment to a tax rate 
that is in the middle of the pack, so we do lose control of our tax 
rate to that extent. I acknowledge that. 
Audience Member: I am thinking about the last point. If 
there is a materially lower rate in Germany than in the U.S., and 
the tax system is working right, then that raises the question: 
Why is that the case? Why would it be that, in Germany, the rate 
on German enterprises is 20% and in the U.S., it is 30%? There 
ought to be pressure to bring the U.S. tax rate down in that case. 
Maybe that sort of goes back to your first point, but probably the 
answer is, it is not going to be lower as a real matter. In fact, if 
you look at OECD countries, real effective tax rates do not 
actually vary all that much, which is one reason why territorial 
worldwide would not be that big of a problem if you did not have 
the stateless income problem. 
Kleinbard: Exactly. 
Audience Member: But then you also have these other 
problems you pointed to, which is: Where does the income arise 
in all of that? 
Kleinbard: Which is why I get to residence, but it absolutely 
means you lose control, and you had to have a rate in the middle 
of the pack. Okay, with that, thank you very much.  
